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THE ALLGEYER CASE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL EMBRASURE OF TERRITORIALITY '
The series of cases in the line from Allgeyer v. Louisiana 1
are suggested as an instructive example of the futility of "solving principles" in Constitutional Law. I refer to the principle of
territoriality; 2 more specifically, the principle that it is "impossible
to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New York."

3

This

principle has never been denied or explicitly qualified in a Supreme
Court opinion. Indeed it has lately received new affirmation and
more vigorous expression from the present Chief Justice. He
speaks of "an imposition upon a contract not made in the Phillipines and having no situs there;" he concludes "we aI'e very
clear that the contract and the premiums paid under it are not
within the jurisdiction of the Phillipine Islands."
Allgeyer v.
Louisiana is the pattern; more, it is the cast-iron mold for a
new judgment. "The authority of these cases," says Taft, C. J.,
"is controlling in disposing of the one before us. The effect of
them is that as a state is forbidden to deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law, it may not compel any one
within its jurisdiction to pay tribute to it for contracts or money
paid -to secure the benefit of contracts made and to be performed
outside of the State."
*It seems hardly worth while to acknowledge help in the preparation
of so modest a paper,--but in all fairness, whatever of freshness is
found herein must be attributed to the stimulation of Professor T. R.
Powell.
'165 U. S. 578 (1896).
'For an authoritative exposition of this principle see Beale, Conflict
of Laws (1916) §§ 104-106. Recent criticisms of the doctrine are to be
found in Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 Yale L. J. 736; Walter Wheeler Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L. J. 457. In its relation to constitutional
limitations upon state action, see E. M. Dodd, Jr., Power of the
Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of
Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533; Greene, Enforcement of Foreign Divorce
Decrees in New York, 11 Cornell L. Q. 141, note 4."
'New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149, 161 (1914).
'Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal
Revenue 275 U. S. - , 72 L. Ed. 83 (Nov. 21, 1927). The case is
discussed in the Harvard L. Rev., January, 1928.
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It might therefore be worth while to examine a small group
of decisions in that Court, with an eye to an inference upon the
flexibility of "unbending" precepts.
Mr. Justice Holmes recently has said with assurance, "the
Constitution and first principles of legal thinking allow the law
of the place where a contract is made to determine the validity
and consequences of the act." ' After that the remaining query
is, -where is a contract made? Most cases agree that a contract
is made where the last act is done that gives the promises legally
binding effect. Thus it may be held that an insurance contract
is made where the policy is mailed; where the agent counter-signs
and delivers it; or where the insured accepts the policy and pays
the first premium. As in all of these cases, it is the agreement
that the insurer's risk is not to attach until the happening of the
event specified, the contracts might well be held to have been made
at different points of time and place.6 "No contract is ever
completed until the last step essential to its binding effect has
been taken." Hard and fast as this rule seems, there is still
considerable "give" left, because we can push the inquiry one step
further,--what is "the last step essential to its binding effect?"
There are worse ways of beginning a comparative study than
by laying our cases on the table.
The first to suggest the problem was, as has been noted,
Allgeyer v. Louisiana.7 In that case the Louisiana statute made
criminal the doing "of any act in this State to effect -:-- insurance
on property then in this State * * -,-in any marine insurance company which has not complied in all respects with the laws of this
State * * *" The defendants entered into an open contract of
insurance in New York with a New York insurance company
which was not qualified in Louisiana. The policy was to cover
shipments of cotton made from Louisiana to foreign buyers from
the time of such shipment, and notification thereof was to be sent
by mail to the New York insurance company. A new and separate policy was to be issued for each risk.
.

'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209, 214 (1922).
' Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262 (1900), Equitable
Life Society v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226 (1890), N. W. Life Insurance
Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (1911), see 63 L. R. A. 834, 52 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 276 and see Williston, Contracts, § 97.
"Supra, note 1.
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The Supreme Court held that the mailing of a letter in
Louisiana to the New York company in order to bring a specific
shipment within the coverage of the blanket policy was not the
making of a contract in Louisiana and could not be made a crime
by that State. The statute was held to contravene the Fourteenth
Amendment in that it attempted to affect a contract made "beyond
the territory" of Louisiana. And to make criminal the innocent
act of mailing a letter was a denial of liberty. To persuade itself
that no contract was made in Louisiana, the Court argued "the
only thing that the facts show was done in Louisiana was the
mailing of a letter of notification * * * which was done after the
principal contract was made." Again, "it was the mere notification that the contract already in existence would attach to that
particular property;" "the giving of the notice is a mere collateral
matter; it is not the contract itself, but is an act performed
pursuant to a valid contract which the State had no right or
jurisdiction to prevent its citizens from making outside the limits
of the State."
The last and direct "heir of the body" of the Allgeyer decision
is the Philippine Tobacco Co. case. The Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas is a Spanish corporation licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands. From time to time it bought goods
and put them into its Philippine warehouse subsequently to be
shipped abroad for re-sale. The local office, upon each of these
occasions would notify the main office in Barcelona and that office
thereupon procured insurance under open policies with London
and Paris* underwriters,-fire insurance when merchandise was
stored in the warehouse and marine insurance when the tobacco
was shipped. Premiums were charged to the Philippine office.
The Philippine Insurance Act provides that where owners of property obtain insurance directly with foreign companies, the owners
are required to "pay the tax of one per centum on premium paid,
in the manner required by law of insurance companies." The
Collector collected this tax from the petitioner under protest. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines in upholding the thx denied that
it involved a deprivation of property without due process of law.8
' Section 3 of the Philippine Organic Act 39 Stat. at L.. 545, 546,

Chap. 416, U. S. C. Tit. 48, § 1008, imposes upon the Philippine legislature the same limitation by which the Fourteenth Amendment restrains
the states of the Union.
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The Supreme Court of the United States in part reversed and in
part affirmed that judgment. The tax upon premiums paid to the
Paris insurance company-which company "had no communication whatever with anyone in the Philippine Islands" was invalidated; the tax upon the premium paid to the London company
"which was licensed and presumably doing business in the Philippine Islands" was sustained. The reasoning behind the first conclusion is briefly put by the Chief Justice:
"It is an imposition upon a contract not made in the
Philippines and having no situs there and to be measured
by money paid as premium in Paris, with the place of
payment of loss, if any, in Paris. We are very clear that
the contract and the premiums paid under, it are not within
the jurisdiction of the government of the Philippine Islands."
Allgeyer v. Louisiana and the St. Louis Cotton Compress 1,
case were deemed controlling the issue. The reasoning behind the
second conclusion is this:
" * * * the question arises whether making and carry-

ing out the policy does not involve an exercise or use of
the right of the London company to do business in the
Philippine Islands under its license, because the policy
covers fire risks on property within the Philippine Islands
which may require adjustment and the activities of agents
in the Philippine Islands with respect to settlement of losses
arising thereunder. This we think must be answered affirmatively under Equitable Life Society, 238 U. S. 143. The
case is a close one but in deference to the conclusion we
reached in the latter case, we affirm the judgment of the
court below." "o
260 U. S. 346. An Arkansas statute imposed a tax of 5% on gross
premiums paid for insurance upon property in Arkansas when the policies
were issued by companies not authorized to do business in that state.
As the policies in this case were contracted for and delivered in
fissouri, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the
Arkansas imposition, saying, "The case is stronger than that of Allgeyer
in that here no act was done within the state, whereas there a letter
constituting a step in the contract was posted within the jurisdiction."
101n the Equitable Life Assurance case, Pennsylvania's taxation of
the company (a New York corporation but doing business in Pennsylvania), upon its gross premiums from business done within the state,
including such premiums as were paid outside the state by residents of
Pennsylvania, was sustained. It is difficult to see why this decision should
have foreclosed the Philippine Co. case. In the former, the contractq
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On the other side of the Philippine case, in point of time, at
least, is the still warm Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Conn."
The Palmetto Insurance Co., a North Carolina corporation qualified to do business in Ohio, sought to enjoin the Superintendent of
Insurance in that state (Ohio) from revoking its license. His
threat to revoke was on the ground that the Palmetto Co. in issuing certificates of insurance in Michigan under its contract with
the Chrysler Corporation, insofar as such certificates applied to
cars sold in Ohio, violated Ohio statutes requiring insurance agents
to be legally authorized and the business to be taxed. The Chrysler plan was this: Palmetto Co. issued an open policy to Chrysler
"and/or whom it may concern" against fire and theft of cars,
the insurance to last one year after the car is sold to the retail
purchaser. This- master policy was executed in Michigan, and kept
there. When a car was sold to a consumer in Ohio, the dealer
notified the Chrysler Corporation and the latter notified the Palmetto agent who sent direct to the purchaser of the car, naming
him, a certificate of insurance-a counter-part of which was sent
to others who might have a lien on the car, e. g. finance companies.
The master policy provided, however, that "the omission to report
the sale or to issue a certificate shall not prevent the retail buyer
of a car from being protected."
The injunction was denied. The court reasoned that the
"thing" in the contract that "Ohio could lay hold of" was this:
"When a man bought a car in Ohio, by that act he made effective
the agreement of the company to insure future purchasers, and
were made in Pennsylvania with residents of Pennsylvania.

In the

Philippine Co. case the contracts were neither made in the Philippines

(according to Chief Justice Taft himself) nor were the parties thereto
domiciled in the Philippines. The only point of semblance is that.in both
cases the corporation taxed was doing business within the state. And it
remains a mystery why this factor should have been thought decisive
by the Chief Justice in the Philippine case.
"272 U. S. 295 (1926) aff'g. 9 Fed. (2d) 202, 666, 674. Substantially
the same question was in issue in four other cases decided at the same
time. Chrysler Sales Corp. v. Spencer, 9 Fed. (2d) 674; UtterbackGleason Co. v. Spencer, semble; Clark Motor Co. v. Smith, 9 Fed. (2d)

666; Chrysler Sales Corp. v. Smith, sa,"nle. And see Palmetto Insurance
Co. v. Beha, 13 Fed. (2d) 500 (S. D. N. Y., 1926). At the time of their
appearance this group of cases aroused interest in the current numbers
of many legal periodicals, see 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 415; 13 Va. L. Rev.
53; 39 Harv. L. Rev. 809; 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 273; 36 Yale L. J. 419;
25 Mich. L. Rev. 777; 61 Am. L. Rev. 442; 26 Col. L. Rev. 1002.
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imposed upon it an obligation that did not exist before " * ::the
act was done in Ohio and the capacity to do it came from the
law of Ohio so that the co6peration of that law' was necessary
to the obligation imposed." 12 Analytically, there is a promise by
A to B for a present consideration, for the benefit of an indeterminate C,' ---to take effect when C becomes determinate by his
acting in a certain way. C's act that may be said to anchor A's
hitherto floating obligation is said to be something "that Ohio
could lay hold of" though Ohio was entirely foreign to the contract between A and B. "It is true that the obligation arose
from a contract made under the law of another State."
We may stop for a moment to study the implications of these
three cases. They all deal with so-called "open" contracts, concededly made outside the state whose power over the subsequent
transaction is in question. The only thing done within that state
is some act that effects a specification of the general policy to a
definite lot of property or to a definite person. In the Allgeyer
case, the specifying act is the mailing of a letter to the insurer;
in the Philippine Company case it is notification of a shipment
transmitted by the local office in the Philippine Islands to the
main office at Barcelona; in the Palmetto case it is the purchase
of a Chrysler car in Ohio. In the first two cases jurisdiction over
the contract by the State of the specifying act was denied; in the
last case jurisdiction by that State was affirmed. The dissenters
in the Philippine Company case (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.) distinguished the Allgeyer case in that there Louisiana was attempting to penalize the contracting party whereas the Philippine government was merely taxing the contract. "It readily may be seen
that a state may tax things that under the Constitution as interpreted it can not prevent." Of course, the sentence quoted states
accurately enough a doctrine of the Supreme Court. But its application to the instant case is faulty because the dissent assumes
exactly what the prevailing members of the Court deny-that
there is jurisdiction in the Philippine government to touch the
contract in any way at all. Certainly such a denial is no more
than warranted by the Allgeyer case which, though it dealt with
a penalty, asserted in the broadest of terms that the contract was
"beyond the territory of" Louisiana. If Louisiana had attempted
'"Supra, at page 304.
"But cf. 26 Col. L. Rev. 1002, 1006 (1926).
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to tax the contract, would the result of the Allgeyer case have
been any different?
Yet the learned dissenting Justices are using a legitimate
technique of lawyers ant judges; they are distinguishing upon
its facts the Allgeyer case from the case before them. And in
doing so they evidence that the strait-jacket conception of jurisdiction plainly implied in the Allgeyer case is not altogether to their
taste. To the majority of the Court, however, the distinction
between a penalty and tax was unsound "in such a case" as the
one before it. And in that they evidence as plainly that they
decline to limit the rationale of the Allgeyer case. The distinction
suggested by Mr. Justice Holmes is far from tenuous; it provides
the Court with an easy escape from the Allgeyer case. But the
Court chose not to escape. On the contrary, the Court reinforced
the doctrine there laid down."
This then would seem to 'be the end of our troubles for the
time being. But there is the Palmetto case to account for-in
which, incidentally, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion of an
unanimous court. And there are some half dozen others.
We may proceed to three cases very much alike.
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head,"5 a Missouri statute
regulating loans on policies of life insurance by the issuing Company, was applied by the Missouri court to a loan closed in New
York but upon the collateral security of an insurance policy that
"conceding for the sake of argument" had been made in Missouri.
The theory of the Missouri court was that "all subsidiary contracts made by the parties to an insurance contract are within
the contemplation and purview of the original contract and are not
to be treated as independent agreements. This being so, they are
inefficacious to alter, change or modify the rights and obligations
as they existed under the original contract of insurance." But
the Supreme Court through White, C.J., dismissed this contention
as "unnecessary to consider" and reversed the state court decision
" However, it must be admitted that the Court's decision in the
second half of the Philippine Co. case shakes considerably the writer's
confidence in the above conclusion. See note 10, supra. After all, it would
have been just as easy for the majority. to have distinguished the
Equitable Assurance Co. case and followed the Allgeyer case through, 48 Sup. Ct.
out. And see Bothwell v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 275 U. S. -

124 (Dec. 5, 1927).
"Supra, note 3.
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as involving a denial of full faith and credit to the New York
law. The Court first posited this question-"how far (was) it
* * * within the power of * * - Missouri to extend its authority
into the State of New York and there forbid the parties " * *
from making such a loan agreement in New York simply because
it modified a contract originally made in Missouri?" And the
question "admitted of but one answer." "6 Missouri could not affect
parties to a Missouri contract "with a perpetual paralysis following them outside the jurisdiction of the state of original contract
by prohibiting them from doing any act or making any agreement
not in accord with the law of the state where the contract was
originally made." This was "so obviously the necessary result
of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in question and
hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound."
In New York Life Insftrance Co. v. Dodge,17 the facts were
substantially the same save that the insured was domiciled in
Missouri and carried on all of his transactions from there. The
Court by a five to four decision followed the implication of the
Head case that to hold otherwise "would sanction the impairment
of that liberty of contract guaranteed to all by the Fourteenth
Amendment." The doctrine was affirmed that Missouri was without power to extend its authority into New York and forbid the
later agreement there made simply because it arose out of the
first one. Brandeis, J. spoke for the other dissenters, Day, Pitney
and Clark, JJ. He did not think the loan agreement was made
in New York but in Missouri. But more fundamentally, "the
loan agreement was not an independent contract; nor is it to be
treated as a modification of the original contract. It was an act
contemplated by the policy and was subsidiary to it, as an incident
thereof. What was done by the officials in New York was not
making a New York contract but performing acts under a Missouri contract." 's
A principle may be inferred from these two cases: the fact
that a, Missouri insurance contract is the authority for and security
" Chief Justice White's penchant

for demonstrating the logical im-

possibility of any view other than the one he is arguing is elsewhere
exhibited. See The Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914) ; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906);

Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
p246 U. S. 357 (1917).
Ibld.

Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
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for a foreign made loan does not give Missouri something "to
lay hold of" in order to justify the application of its statutes
to the enforcement of the loan.
In the next case, Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing,19 the
Supreme Court permitted the Missouri court to apply the Missouri
statute to a loan made under essentially the same circumstances
as in the Dodge case. A two-fold distinction was pointed out by
Holmes, J. for the Court. First, the difference in language between "loans can be had" (Dodge and Head cases) and "the company * * * will * * * loan"

(Liebing case).

On the latter

phraseology, said the Court, it might be held that the application
for the loan made in Missouri to the local agent was ipso facto
an acceptance of the Company's irrevocable offer to make a loan.
Second, the check for the loan was delivered in Missouri by the
company's local agent to the borrower and therefore (if for no
other reason) the contract was made there. But under either
supposition-be it noted-Missouri is the favored state not because
the loan was deemed subsidiary to and an incident of the Missourimade insurance policy; but solely because the contract of loan was
made there also. There remains then a satisfactory semblance
of coherence between this case and the principle just inferred
from the Dodge and Head cases. It is apparently still the desire
of the Court to deny the theory of the dissenters in the Dodge
case, viz., that the loan agreement "was an act contemplated by
the policy and was subsidiary to it, as an incident thereof" and
that "what was done ('by the loan agreement) was not making
a (new) contract but performing acts under (the old) contract."
The foregoing three cases warrant this inference as to the
subject of our study: Acts contemplated in a prior agreement and
done in pursuance of such agreement may be subjected to legal
consequences only by the state wherein the acts were done. This
sounds like Palmetto; but it is strangely foreign to the
Allgeyer case.
There are at least two other relevant cases. The first is
Provident Saving Life Ass. Soc. v. Kentucky.20 The defendant
insurance company had withdrawn from business in Kentucky
but continued to be 'bound on previously made contracts, receiv19

Supra, note 5.

'239 U. S. 103 (1915).
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ing renewal premiums through the mail from Kentucky. The
Court said, "these policies are contracts already made; the State
cannot destroy them or make their mere continuance, independent
of acts within its limits, a privilege to be granted or withheld.
Neither the continuance of the obligation itself nor acts done elsewhere on account of it can be regarded as being within the State's
control." It is obviously inaccurate to state that the continuance of
the policies was "independent of acts within its (Kentucky's)
limits." Premiums were mailed in Kentucky. The Court must
have meant that whatever was done in Kentucky was insignificant
-just as the mailing of a letter in Louisiana was deemed insignificant in the Allgeyer case as a hook upon which to hang an
interdict. It was not-to use the test of Mr. Justice Holmes in
the Palnetto case, something that Kentucky "could lay hold of."
The last case that need be considered is Aetna Life Insurance
v. Dunken.2 1 A seven year term policy was issued to the insured
while he was resident in Tennessee. By its terms at the sole
option of the insured it was convertible into a 20-payment life
policy upon payment of the difference in premiums. Six years
later, the insured then resident in Texas, applied for a conversion
of his policy "in accordance with the conditions." The old policy
was cancelled and a new one issued from New York to the Tennessee agent and by him forwarded to Texas. Three months later
the insured died and when the insurance company delayed payment, suit was brought in Texas and the damages recovered
included a statutory penalty of 12% and attorney's fees, in accordance with the Texas statute. Writ of error issued on the ground
that this Texas statute could not be applied constitutionally to
this policy which was not made in Texas. The Supreme Court
held that the second policy was not a new contract. "It was
issued in pursuance of and was dependent for its existence and
its terms upon the express provisions of the contract contained
in the first one. * * * Nothing was left to future agreement. The
terms of the new policy were fixed where the original policy
was made. It was issued not as the result of any new negotiations or agreement but in discharge of a pre-existing obligation.
It merely fulfilled promises then outstanding; and did not arise
from new or additional promises." This language might have been
=266 U. S. 389 (1924).
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written verbatim by the dissenters in the Dodge case; doubtless it
would have been approved by the Court that decided the Allgeyer
case or the Philippine Company case. But it cries for a reconciliation with the Head, Dodge and Liebing group of cases, to say
nothing of the Palmetto case. Here the insured had an option
of getting an altogether new policy in place of the old. The
option was exercised in Texas by a resident of Texas; the old
policy was cancelled, a new one issued, and yet Texas had "nothing to lay hold of."
The distinctions between the Allgeyer, Dunken and Philippine
Company cases on one hand, and the Palmetto case on the other,
are possibly the following.
First, the act necessary to make effective the pre-existing
agreement of the company to insure was in the Allgeyer and in the
Philippine Company cases, the mailing of information; in the
Dunken case, the mailing of an application; but in the Palmetto
case, the purchase of a Chrysler car.
Second, in the first three cases, the person or corporation who
entered into the original agreement was the same as the one who
did the effectuating act. In the Palmetto case the parties were
different.
As to the first distinction, Mr. Justice Holmes perhaps
shadowed it when he said: "It is true that the obligation arose
from a contract made under the laws of another State but the act
was done in Ohio and the capacity to do it came from the law
of Ohio so that the cooperation of that law was necessary to the
obligation imposed." But if this suggestion is to be taken, it will
involve the repudiation of much that we have already learned.
Thus, suppose A in New York makes an offer to B in Pennsylvania and B mails his acceptance from the latter state. The
contract is made in Pennsylvania because "the last step essential to
its binding effect" took place there. Will the fact that A' gets
legal capacity to make an offer from New York where he acts
enable New York "to lay hold of" the contract and say, tax it;
or apply one of its statutory provisions to it? So in the Head
and Dodge cases, certainly legal capacity to borrow was bestowed
by the law of the place where the borrower was and such capacity
"was necessary to the obligation imposed ;" yet the contract of loan
could only be "taken hold of" by the- state wherein the loan-was
"closed" by the advance of the money or the acceptance of the
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application. In short, it is not every state "the cooperation (of
whose) law (is) necessary to the obligation imposed" that can
"take hold of" a contract; it is only the state where "the last step
essential to its binding effect has been taken" that has such power.
So we come back to where we started-what is the last essential
act? And apparently we must be satisfied with the answer that
in the Allgeyer, Dunken and Philippine cases the last step essential
to the contract's binding effect is one thing and in the Palmetto
case, it is another. A reason why this should be so may perhaps
be found in the second distinction above noted.
The second distinction was that in the Allgeyer and Dunken
cases the contracting parties were the same throughout, whereas
"n Palmetto, the party who made the policy specific by buying
a car was different from the person who entered into the original
blanket 15olicy. Mr. justice Holmes felt for this reason when he
said. "the substance is that by acts done in Ohio the purchaser
obtains for himself the advantage of insurance that before that
moment did not exist."
The purchaser in Ohio buys a car; but he also is a brand new
insurance customer. Chrysler is like a retailer that sells piecemeal the insurance it has bought in wholesale lots. Chrysler's
selling of Palmetto insurance in Ohio is in competition with the
selling of locally qualified insurer's. It cuts down their sales and
if untaxed would deprive Ohio of much revenue that in the
normal course would flow to Ohio coffers.
This I believe is a sound reason for deciding the Palmetto
case as the court did. But a doubt persists-would not the same
reasoning have called for a similar result in the Allgeyer and
Philippine Company cases?
As to those everlasting searchers for a rule-even in Constitutional Law-what is to be told them to sustain their faith?
Perhaps this will do:
1. Where an "open" contract of insurance entered into
in one state, is subsequently made the coverage for a
specific unit of goods by means of mailing of information
from another state, the latter state may neither penalize the
subsequent effectuating act nor justify a tax because of it.
2. Where, however, given the same situation plus the
fact that the insurer is qualified to do business in the
second state, such state may justify a tax because of the
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subsequent effectuating act. Quaere whether the second
state may penalize the effectuating act. Quaere whether
in view of the second half of the Philippine Company decision the second state need show any act within its borders
at all,-whether the mere doing of business by the insurer,
other business than the contract in question, that is, is not
enough to support jurisdiction to tax.
3. Where an "open" contract of insurance entered into
in one state is subsequently made the coverage for a specific
unit of goods by means of a sale of such goods in another
state and for the benefit of the buyer of such goods, the
latter state may justify a tax upon the insurance of such
goods; and further, it may penalize or prevent such a mode
of acquiring insurance upon the goods purchased.
4. Where an insurance policy offers the insurer a
privilege of subsequently -borrowing from the insurer, the
only state whose statutes may be applied to the loan is the
state where the loan itself was consummated. The state
that governs the insurance policy "has no power to extend
its authority" over the loan.
5. Where an insurance policy made in one state offers
an option of conversion into a new policy and such option
of conversion is exercised in a second state, then the only
state whose statutes may be applied to the new policy is
the state where the first policy was made.
The legal systematizer who is pained by this photograph of
clashing detail as a faithless representation of the simple concept
of territoriality may find comfort in the thought that Supreme
Court decisions are not born to sit for their portraits.
NATHAN GREENE.

New York City.

